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ABSTRACT

This paper presents three views on the University of Pittsburgh campus expansion: from a university representative, from a city planner, and from a community leader. Three salient points made by the authors indicate: (1) The University's main concern was with the development of its own physical plant; community development was a peripheral concern. However, both the community member and the city representative show that the community was concerned with the inter-relationships and consequences of residential, commercial and institutional development. (2) The University usually takes a progmatic approach to expansion, viewing its constituency as regional and national, and thus is less concerned about the expansion's negative impact on Oakland. In contrast, the community and the city are very much concerned with the University's impact on Oakland, and moreover, the community expects the University to adhere to a higher standard of citizenship and service than is usually expected of institutions. (3) The three writers agree that the University was not responsive to changes in societal values which would have required citizen input to institutional planning. (Author/MJM)

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PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPUS EXPANSION: THREE VIEWS

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PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPUS EXPANSION:

THREE VIEWS

Edited by

Paul C. Shaw

June, 1973

This report was prepared under the auspices of the University-Urban Interface Program; Principal Investigator, Albert C. Van Dusen, Secretary of the University; Director, Robert C. Brictson.

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PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPUS EXPANSION: THREE VIEWS

Introduction

The interaction between major metropolitan universities and their urban communities has become a matter of national concern. The increasing intensity of our urban problems and the growing public awareness of them have made these problems a top domestic priority. At the same time, universities have come to be viewed as a powerful resource for the practical solution of all sorts of national problems, especially those peculiar to the urban environment.

However, those urban universities that attempted to meet the increased demand during the 1950's and early 1960's for a higher education by expanding their physical plants have frequently encountered hostile reactions by the residents of their local communities. As a consequence of a great rural to urban migration, universities have found themselves competing for city space. Thus many "universities have been forced to consider their relations within their districts, their immediate neighbors, the municipal governments of which they are constituents, and the major forces of the metropolitan region from which they expect support".*

Because of this growing concern over urban problems, the developing view of urban universities as a resource in urban problem-solving, and because the rapid expansion of urban universities was often seen as contributing to the problems of the city, the University of Pittsburgh proposed that the U.S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, fund an investigation of the interface between Pitt and its

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*Kermit C. Parsons and Georgia K. Davis, "The Urban University and Its Urban Environment," Minerva, Vol. IX (July, 1971), p. 361.

urban community. Subsequently, the University-Urban Interface Program (UUIP) was founded to study, chronicle, and concurrently evaluate Pitt's community relations efforts and innovations, their successes and failures. An ultimate goal was that of designing ways in which these relations might be enriched, as well as providing insights or guidelines for other institutions. Pittsburgh was believed to be an ideal site for such a study. The city is a typically complex metropolitan area, and the University had plans for a $50 million campus expansion program.

Included in the proposal to OE was a plan for the study of Pitt's attempts at carrying out its campus master plan. The decision to include campus development as an area of study was prophetic. Only a few short months after the formation of the UUIP research team, the local community organized to challenge Pitt's planned expansion. This report was prepared as part of UUIP's campus expansion research effort.

During the Summer of 1972, three observers of the campus expansion controversy agreed to prepare for UUIP individual papers offering their perspectives on the controversy. Each of the three--one community member, one city representative, and one University employee--have experience as "first-hand" participants in the dispute. The community member is a founder of People's Oakland (the community coalition that challenged Pitt expansion); the city representative has been an active participant in the tripartite meetings and continues to be involved, but to a lesser extent, in Oakland Development, Incorporated (ODI). The University staff member, although not involved as a negotiator at the tripartite or joint-planning sessions, has nevertheless served as a University spokesman and has frequently been involved in a staff support capacity. Thus, each has significant experience with and involvement in the campus expansion dispute.

The papers offer each author's personal or individual interpretation. Each was provided by UUIP with a suggested but flexible outline to maximize comparability; it was understood by the authors, however, that they could deviate from the format to the extent necessary to present their own interpretation and analysis of the issue. The prepared format suggested that each paper consider goals and objectives of involved groups, extant issues, perceptions of the consequences of expansion, and prognosis for the future of University-community relationships.

The resultant papers generally conform to the topic format, but included also additional perspectives or insights. Each was approximately 20 pages in length.*

To the researcher, the three papers are valuable as data sources. They add insights not easily found elsewhere, they confirm many of our conclusions, and they add valuable pieces of substantive data.

In addition, to the interested reader, the papers are provocative and readable accounts--from the perspectives of three major participants--of the evaluation of a community-wide issue.

Most importantly, the papers suggest potential areas of accord, or the means for resolving common differences. Three salient points made by the authors:

-- The University's main concern was with the development of its own physical plant; community development was a peripheral concern. However, both the community member and the city representative

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*A summary analysis of the three papers is included as Part III of a complete analysis of the expansion controversy: Paul C. Shaw, Truth, Love and Campus Expansion: The University of Pittsburgh Experience, University of Pittsburgh: University-Urban Interface Program, June, 1973.

show that the community was concerned with the inter-relationships and consequences of residential, commercial and institutional development.

-- The University usually takes a pragmatic approach to expansion, viewing its constituency as regional and national, and thus is less concerned about expansion's negative impact on Oakland. In contrast, the community and the city are very much concerned with the University's impact on Oakland, and moreover, the community expects the University to adhere to a higher standard of citizenship and service than is usually expected of institutions.

-- The three writers agree that the University was not responsive to changes in societal values which would have required citizen input to institutional planning.

PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPUS EXPANSION:

A VIEW FROM A UNIVERSITY REPRESENTATIVE

The simple answer to the question of what the University of Pittsburgh hopes to achieve in terms of its physical expansion is this: sufficient facilities to meet its program and population needs into the foreseeable future.

An equally simple diagram for how to achieve that objective also has been explicitly recognized by most people at the University, at least since 1967:

1. Identify the needs.
2. Develop a plan to meet those needs with a minimum of disruption to the surrounding community.
3. Obtain approval of community citizens, at least tacitly, for the development of the plan.
4. Secure funding for the plan, primarily through agencies of government -- that is, the General State Authority on the Commonwealth level, and the U.S. Department of Education, the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and other agencies on a national level.
5. Secure necessary local governmental support -- such as re-zoning, building permits, etc. -- even though there was some question as to whether such approvals were legally required.
6. Let contracts and build.

Pitt's concern with the development of the surrounding community was at best peripheral to the central issue of building an adequate physical plant. While it didn't want to antagonize the community and certainly was interested in seeing community development that would be supportive of University activities -- such

as good housing for students and faculty, shops serving the academic community, etc. -- it had no plan to take a leading role in community-wide planning.

In 1967, the University thought it had a clear picture of its long-term growth, at least through the remainder of the century. By 1968 -- within a year after the beginning of a new Pitt administration -- a comprehensive master plan had been created. The specific charge to the architect had been to provide sufficient facilities, locate them in logical groupings in terms of academic program, use wherever possible existing University-owned land, and keep to a minimum the disruption of the surrounding community.

By the summer of 1971, the University believed it had moved conscientiously through the first four steps for implementing its plan and was prepared to seek local government approval.

Then, suddenly, nearly everything seemed to go wrong, and what had seemed a logical, orderly, considerate procedure fell apart. Citizens claimed they never had been consulted about the University's construction program. City government demanded more from the University than simple obeisance to zoning and construction regulations; it wanted tax relief and citizen participation in planning, not just citizen approval of already-developed plans. State government, itself pressed for tax funds, put a lid on enrollment growth and a moratorium on academic construction throughout Pennsylvania. And there was not even unanimity within the University administration that the originally identified needs, once thought to have been essential, were still accurate. Thus Pitt found itself, for all practical purposes back at Step One.

What happened to cause all this?

If blame is to be laid on any one factor (which is unrealistic) it would have to be on the difference in the time frames under which buildings are built

and political changes take place. For certainly there were dramatic changes in the political and economic assumptions on which the 1968 master plan had been based by the time Pitt was ready to proceed in 1971.

The first two projects in Pitt's proposed master plan development were the construction of dormitories on the hillside above O'Hara Street and below Pitt stadium, and the development of the area around Forbes Field, which the University had owned since 1959 and which the Pittsburgh Pirates Baseball Club was scheduled to vacate before 1970. The Forbes Area development had received its initial funding in 1968, and construction awaited only the availability of the property.

For nearly a decade prior to 1968, University construction had gone forward almost routinely in an extremely favorable political climate under a series of hospitable state and city government administrations, i.e., the administrations of Governors Lawrence, Scranton and Shaefer at the state level, and the administration of Mayor Joseph Barr in the city. During this period, the only active community opposition to University development plans was raised by a group that had organized around the Oakland Chamber of Commerce in opposition to a feared encroachment on the community by a development corporation founded by former Pitt Chancellor Edward H. Litchfield. The development corporation, made up of Pitt and other institutions in Oakland, had announced its intention to become the primary developer for urban renewal projects in the district. But at the outset, it was unclear what these projects would be and the development corporation's work was not separated in the public mind from Pitt's own expansion which, at this time, also included an early plan for the development of the Forbes Field site. While the Oakland community group subsequently claimed it had "saved" the district from the "ravages" of Pitt's urban renewal, in

actuality no comprehensive plan for Oakland was ever developed and the corporation's work was halted by Pitt's own financial difficulties and its inability to develop an economically viable proposal for a research park, which was its sole articulated project.

Nevertheless, the new Pitt administration had learned a lesson from the past, and one of its first actions after developing the 1968 master plan was to show it to the Oakland Chamber and other civic groups--such as Kiwanis and Rotary--as well as to the Oakland Model Cities organization, which had come into existence just a year or two earlier. There also was widespread newspaper publicity about the plan. Hearing little or no dissent, and still relying on the support of local and state government, the University assumed it could proceed.

Under the most favorable of circumstances, construction could not have begun on any part of the master plan until early 1970. But in 1970, it was delayed until almost the end of the year, first by the delay in completion of the new Three Rivers Stadium, which prevented the Pirates from moving out on schedule, and subsequently by a moratorium on new construction brought about by the Black Construction Coalition's action against the building trades unions.

The delay was significant. It extended the period between the development of the University's master plan and the time of its implementation, a period in which important political changes came to fruition in both society and government.

Take the "community," for example. Broadly conceived, it is composed of a variety of elements, each with its own motivation and objective. First, there are those Oakland residents who are directly affected by the University's expansion, either because their homes are to be taken or because large-scale University facilities are to be built adjacent to them, thereby creating changes in population density, parking and traffic patterns, and conflicts in life styles. Second, there are those residents who, though not immediately adjacent to the campus, nevertheless feel some effects from the expansion of the largest

institution in their district and, indeed, one of the largest institutions in the city. These effects range from pressures of real estate speculators who wish to buy up property to put up apartments and shops to capitalize on the University market, changes in the "character" of the district from one of long-term ethnically-grouped residents to a district composed of students, nurses, technicians, secretaries, faculty and medical personal who tend to be more transient, plus the aforementioned changes in parking, traffic patterns and population density. Third, there are the political activists of the campus itself who, at their most idealistic, firmly believe in participatory democracy and who start with the institution at hand in their attempt to implement the concept. It is no accident, for example, that early warnings to Columbia University about the shortcomings of its proposed gymnasium on Morningside Heights came from its own social work faculty and that it was a faculty-community coalition that defeated that project. (At their least idealistic, there are campus activists who, having lost their student following either because of responsive changes on the part of the institution or a student lapse into conventional politics or political apathy, may be simply looking for a new political power base.) Fourth, there are some campus activists, from both the black and white communities, who have firm ideas about alternative styles of education -- education, for instance, that takes place within communities, instead of bringing community residents to the campus -- which affects how they view the need for new large-scale campus facilities. And finally, there are groups both on the campus and off who see the University as a mechanism for diverting federal, state and private resources to community uses -- in short, as a sort of non-governmental taxing unit through which they can gain a larger share of scarce resources for urban improvement. (That this should happen is not entirely unacceptable. "Establishment" institutions, such as corporations and governments, long have used the technical expertise available from universities to supplement their own resources, and the

universities, in return, get something out of this activity for their teaching and research missions. It is not unreasonable for universities now to provide some of this same kind of help to non-establishment groups -- or perhaps, "not-yet-establishment" groups -- seeking social or economic self-development. The only problem is to do it in a way that also does not divert the university entirely from its teaching and research functions and, in fact, contributes to those functions.) Pervading all these diverse elements was the emerging concept of citizen participation and neighborhood self-determination. Individual campus and non-campus citizens became more "politicized" by the turn of the decade as the result of the civil rights movements and campus activism of the 1960's, and in this "new politics" action is more likely to take place outside of existing civic and governmental organizations and frequently in the form of direct action.

But the various elements that make up this "community" do not always naturally coalesce, and it is interesting to speculate on what may have caused them to come together "against" the university's expansion program. ("Against" actually is too simple a description; only a small proportion of the community coalition is thoroughly opposed to any university expansion.)

The University administration had had no prior experience with this kind of coalition. It had built a large engineering building on campus in the 1968-71 period with scarcely a murmur of community opposition and, in the same period, made only minor concessions to residents of an adjacent well-to-do neighborhood in winning City Planning Commission and City Council approval for a new chemistry building. The first "master plan" building project which it proposed to implement was the hillside dormitory. Pitt anticipated little or no opposition to the development, since it was being built entirely on university-owned land which had

previously been considered unusable because of its steep slope but which the university had decided to develop primarily to minimize the amount of additional land that would have to be taken from the community for student housing.

Thus the University was stunned when opposition developed, and somewhat outraged that its good intentions toward the community in choosing to develop this site were not recognized. As a result, the University was not as responsive as it might have been to the original dissidents -- certainly less responsive than it had been to on-campus dissent in the late 1960's -- and as a result may have contributed to the forging of the coalition of community groups that now seek a more imperative voice in University planning.

The first opposition came from the parents of children attending Falk School, a laboratory school owned and operated by the University, who appeared not to have been adequately informed or brought into the discussions concerning the University's proposed hillside development. The development involved the relocation of the Falk School playground, and the first notification that the parents claimed to have had of the project was the appearance of surveyors on the grounds of the school in the midst of a Parent-Teachers Association meeting.

The parent's public protest, in turn, drew the attention of community residents in the adjacent Schenley Heights Area, an integrated middle-class community, who also protested the development for other reasons, already mentioned. They were joined by residents of Schenley Farms, the neighborhood that orginally had opposed Pitt's chemistry building, and by a small student-organized group, largely composed of residents of a leased home alongside Falk School which would be torn down to make way for the relocated playground. As the University continued to resist what it regarded as outside "intrusion" on a project to be built entirely on its own property, still more groups became involved, including some

activist faculty and students, the Model Cities Organization (which had itself undergone a change in management since 1968), black organizations both on and off campus, neighborhood groups and block clubs.

Ironically, the project they were protesting was further from implementation than the Forbes Field project, which was a much more direct incursion on the community. The Forbes Area development was funded; the hillside dorms were not and, in fact, they have not been to this day. But there developed among some members of the University administration the notion that "if we don't win this one, we'll never get Forbes Field," since "this one" certainly presented the "community" with far less rhetorical ammunition than the proposed Forbes development. So instead of relenting as opposition grew stronger, the University's resistance to giving its neighbors a voice in its planning stiffened.

Eventually, of course, the University conceded some points to the community and redesigned the hillside project to accomodate major citizen complaints. But by this time, the community had developed an embryonic broad-based organization to deal with university expansion in general, and the community's consciousness of Pitt expansion had been dramatically heightened.

The fight over Forbes Field followed, University expansion remained stalled and, finally, on July 28, 1971 the University agreed to undertake joint planning for all future development projects.

The impact of the community on the university cannot be fully understood unless one also comprehends the changes that had taken place in city and state government between 1968 and 1971. These changes provided the citizens of Oakland with crucial leverage to force changes in Pitt's approach to development.

Between 1968 and 1971, a new city administration had taken office. The theme of Mayor Peter Flaherty's campaign and subsequent administration has been one of

protecting the "little guy" against the big institutions that dominate his life by forcing him to bear the tax burden of costly public works which chiefly benefit the big institutions. Holding the line on taxes and frugality in government have been held to be the chief virtues by the new city administration. In his first budget address to City Council, the mayor stated flatly that he would not allow tax-exempt institutions to expand, removing more property from the tax rolls, unless they found some way to recompense the city for the less. Oddly enough, the University administration paid only scant attention to this initial shot across the bow, perhaps because it was difficult to tell at first how much the mayor was dealing in political rhetoric and how much of the rhetoric he intended to convert into public policy. (It was only much later that some top university administrators discovered and read the doctoral dissertation the Mayor had prepared when he was a student in the University's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. His topic was the effect of tax exempt properties on the tax base.) Another reason why Pitt administrators may not have been deeply concerned over the Mayor's remarks is that the master plan actually called for what the University believed to be relatively little new property acquisiton. The only additional property to be acquired under the plan was a couple of blocks of commercial and residential properties in the Forbes area and possible acquisition for a new medical science building in the Lothrop-Darragh street area, and much of this was far into the future. The immediate needs for the first phase of the Forbes area development involved mostly commercial properties along one block of Forbes Avenue, a couple of small apartment buildings, and a few private residences.

The city did not fully enter the lists in the battle over University expansion until the fight developed over Forbes Field, the first project which would remove property from the tax rolls. The community initially based its

opposition to this development on the premise that Forbes Field was a unique piece of architecture which could be preserved and transformed for joint University and community use. But even some of the proponents of the "save Forbes Field" plan tacitly conceded that Forbes Field was only a hostage to be used in forcing a larger commitment from the University for joint planning. Serious negotiations between the University and the community did not really begin until the City Planning Department, speaking for the mayor, made clear that it would not support the University's application for construction permits and zoning changes unless the University first reached a satisfactory agreement with the community on a plan and with the city for some kind of payment to offset the loss of properties being taken off the tax rolls.

To some at the University, this seemed like a form of extortion. There were no requirements in law for the University to do any of these things. Pitt, as state-related university, was an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, as well as a tax-exempt institution. Under the law, tax exempt institutions cannot be forced to pay taxes and cities cannot tax facilities built by state agencies. In fact, one reading of existing law would lead to the conclusion that no city approvals were required for any kind of construction by a Commonwealth instrumentality. But the problem was really one of practical politics, not law. It was clear that the City could hold up University construction for years through a series of court tests.

Pitt, then, could either fight or accede. But it could undertake neither of these options unilaterally. If it fought, the delay in construction would cause inflationary increases in the eventual cost of construction, and these increases would have to be borne by the General State Authority which was funding the Forbes area development. The state, then, would have to concur in

any decision to fight. On the other hand, if Pitt acceded and agreed to a payment to the city to offset tax losses, there was some fear that Harrisburg would object to the city using the state-supported University as a device for securing more state support through an indirect route. Thus the state also would have to concur in any decision to accede. Pitt did not want to become whipsawed in a political battle between the mayor and the governor. So in the final stages of the negotiations to create a joint planning mechanism, the state's position became critical.

The state, too, had undergone a change of administration in the 1968-71 period. Like Mayor Flaherty, Governor Milton Shapp's administration was placing heavy emphasize on fiscal problems. It was trying to negotiate a new state income tax and, concurrently, to cut down state spending and bring more orderly planning to the state's fiscal picture. Since 1965, when Pitt had become a state-related university, it had been operating without any clear direction from the Commonwealth about its long-term growth and support from the legislature. Thus the 1968 master plan had as its underlying assumption an almost open-ended growth prospect, with Pitt continuing to expand to meet all of the demands for admission it received from capable Pennsylvania students. Between 1965 and 1971, the University's enrollment had increased by 50%, and the student population numbered in excess of 30,000.

The new state administration, however, began to impose some limits on growth for Commonwealth-related universities. Pitt was told, for example, that it should stabilize its enrollment in most schools and divisions at current levels, to consider reducing enrollments in schools where there already was an overabundance of personnel (teacher education, for example), and to anticipate only modest growth in fields where there were labor shorages, such as the health professions.

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In terms of physical plant facilities, the new state administration indicated it would support only those projects already in the General State Authority pipeline, which were clearly necessary to accomodate the expansion that Pitt already had incurred. Thus, both within the University and without, some of the premises upon which the 1968 master plan's longer-term facilities had been predicated now seemed to be no longer valid. About all that Pitt could anticipate in new facilities from the state, then, was the first phase of the Forbes project development, plus a new nursing school building -- already scheduled to be built above an Oakland parking garage -- and perhaps some facility for the medical sciences. And the state was anxious to get the Forbes project underway as expeditiously as possible to keep the costs of the project from rising further. In the political arena, while the Governor and the Mayor had had some minor political skirmishes over patronage in Allegheny county, neither party was anxious for an open dispute over the city's attempt to gain revenue from the University to make up for lost taxes. Thus the state ultimately took the position that it did not want to align itself with the University in a political battle against city government and local citizens, and it supported the idea of a negotiated, reasonable settlement, even though that might cause some delay and increase to some degree the cost of the Forbes Phase I project.

Thus, when the July 28 agreement was signed, it called for a state representative to chair the meetings of the joint planning group involving city, community and university representatives.

Bernard J. Kobosky, vice chancellor for public affairs at Pitt and the University's chief negotiator in the discussions, described what happened next in a statement to the City Planning Commission on June 2:

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"There followed four months of intensive discussion and meetings relating not only to the Forbes Phase I project specifically, but to the creation of a permanent organization for joint planning in Oakland and to the use of land that now would no longer be needed for the Forbes project.

"The next major development came some four months after the July 28 agreement -- at a community meeting held on November 8, 1971. In the intervening period, University planners in consultation with community architects and the City Planning Department agreed to completely relocate the two buildings for the first phase of the Forbes Area project. The quadrangle building for (the school of) education and the (departments of the) social sciences, orginally proposed to run on a north-south axis along Oakland Avenue, was re-sited on an east-west axis on the site of Forbes Field proper. And the law building, first planned for location on the Forbes Field site, was moved to a position adjacent to David L. Lawrence Hall.

"The plan had to be approved by the University's Board of Trustees and, in particular, by the General State Authority. By this time, the GSA had allocated some $44.9-million to the project to offset rising costs created by delay and inflation, and the new plan would require some $3 to $5-million more from the state to cover the costs of redesign and re-siting of the structure. By formal vote on November 8, the representatives of the community, the University and the city agreed to let the University propose this new site plan to the University's Board and to GSA. The plan was presented to the Board and approved the next day, and one day after that it was submitted to GSA which subsequently agreed to the changes.

"This is the plan which we are submitting for the Commission's consideration today. We have delayed these additional seven months while we continued to talk to the community about the creation of a permanent joint planning group for Oakland, involving not only community representatives and the city, but representatives from other Oakland institutions as well. Such a planning group, tentatively known as Oakland Development Incorporated (ODI), was approved at a joint University-city-community meeting on May 11."

One of the first official acts of ODI was to unanimously approve Pitt's redesigned Forbes Phase I plan. At about the same time, Pitt quietly negotiated an agreement with the Flaherty administration for an annual payment by Pitt for city services, equal to the amount of taxes lost to the city by the removal of land for the project. These actions paved the way for the University's presentation to the City Planning Commission on June 2, which subsequently was

approved by the Commission and the City Council.

Ironically, however, the land which Pitt was, in effect, paying for was no longer to be used in the Forbes Phase I project, and one of the first ventures of ODI will be to figure out some use for it acceptable to the University, the city and the community. In addition, the city has proposed some street relocations, a land swap with Pitt and construction of an underground parking garage in Schenley Plaza (bonds for which are to be underwritten by the University) which ODI also is considering. ODI, therefore, has some immediate tasks that transcend the particular construction projects which caused its creation and which are not constricted by some of the prior commitments that had hampered collaborative planning for the Forbes project. Therefore, ODI is likely to remain, at least for some time, a viable organization for collaborative planning.

With this as background, we can begin to look at some of the particular issues involved in the whole concept of joint planning.

Is ODI the best mechanism for joint planning? Is joint planning itself a good idea? Who should be represented in the joint planning process? And what kind of authority should ODI have?

It is clear that no University construction can be undertaken in the future unless the "community" is satisfied that it has participated in the planning process, and unless the city is satisfied that there has been adequate community input and restitution for any tax loss. Any mechanism which adequately meets these requirements will suffice, and ODI is probably as good a mechanism as any, since it provides a seat at the negotiating table for every discernible community element, as well as the city government. It also broadens the focus of interest from a narrow concentration on Pitt's

expansion to a comprehensive view of all institutional expansion in Oakland and, indeed, of all Oakland development, institutional and otherwise.

So the advantage of collaborative planning is that it is the only way the University can build new facilities in the future. The potential disadvantage is that it could permit a locally-oriented group to prevent the University from building facilities that may be essential to the University's larger constituency in the county, the state and the nation.

Collaborative planning is not the best mechanism for handling citizen participation in broader institutional decision-making. It cannot deal with the broader questions of academic program and student population growth which create the need for facilities, yet by hampering the creation of those facilities it can have an impact on these broader issues. Perhaps the University should seek some method for including citizen representation on its Board of Trustees, on an advisory council or on the various committees now being created to consider long-term academic planning so that the public interest is adequately represented in the basic decisions that lead to decisions about facilities. And perhaps this public interest representation could establish a liaison with the community planning group.

It is difficult to say what will result from the collaborative planning process now created. In its initial agreement with the community on July 28, 1971, Pitt stated: "While planning can be done jointly, University fiscal resources will be employed only for that portion of development which is related to academic needs." In the area immediately under discussion for joint planning -- the Oakland-Bouquet-Forbes block south to 239 Oakland Avenue -- there are no state funds to support University construction. The only way the University could justify new construction or remodeling in this area would be by amortizing

the cost over several years against the rental it is now paying for off-campus space in Oakland. The community has no source of funding, unless some portion of the proposed development proves attractive to a private entrepeneur. And that opportunity is limited by a "no commercial" clause in the purchase agreements the General State Authority made with former owners of the land. Short of finding such an entrepeneur, the community's best hope for acquiring facilities in the area are the support of the city for parks and recreational areas, or some University facility, essential for academic purposes, which could be made available to the community at times when it is not being used for the academic program.

As for the scope of ODI's authority, it is clear that it has no formal "authority" in law; without city support and University cooperation, it is powerless. But, under the present political circumstances, it has an overriding influence. If political circumstances change, then ODI's power could dwindle and planning for campus expansion could revert to the more formal, legally constituted governmental authority of the City Planning Department, the City Planning Commission and the City Council.

The question of the representativeness of ODI and its predecessor groups deeply concerned the University administration for a time. How could it be sure that groups which were largely self-appointed really did represent some community constituency? Certainly they were not representative in the way that elected government officials are representative.

This hurdle was finally overlooked when it became clear that city government was willing to accord authority to the coalition of community groups that opposed Pitt, and when ODI itself took into its membership every identifiable community group, including many that supported Pitt's original planning efforts. Presumably

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ODI will have to continue operating in this manner, and if some new special interest community group should emerge it would have to be embraced into the organization. One thing is clear at the moment: There does not seem to be any significant body of the Oakland public that is willing to stand up and say that ODI does not represent them, so ODI has achieved a kind of representativeness by default. While some in the Pitt administration may still be uncomfortable with this "new politics" approach to things, there really is no choice but to deal with ODI.

As for the future, clearly the kinds of facilities which the University will seek to build will be dominated by the basic notion that most of higher education is something that still takes place on a campus with classrooms, laboratories, lecture halls, libraries, auditoriums and faculty offices. But certainly to a larger extent than in the past there is an effort to move some portion of education out from the main campus, through programs of external studies, community institutes, general studies programs held in suburban schools, experimental or specialized colleges developing at regional campuses and opportunities for students to undertake practicums in "real world" situations. This trend, in turn, will tend to diminish the number of facilities required in Oakland that would be necessary if traditional modes prevailed entirely.

In Oakland, too, there probably will be a trend to "open up" the campus, to build cultural, recreational and meeting facilities that can serve the community as well as the University, and to channel University expertise into the community on the same basis it has been channeled to governments and corporations in the past, with some hope of beneficial return to the teaching and research program. The University's contribution to the community is more likely to take this form, rather than direct financial support for community

enterprises. For its part, the community will have to contribute its understanding and support for needed academic facilities in exchange, perhaps, for both University expertise in support of its own development and perhaps part-time use of the facilities. While the city has set an important precedent for securing some financial aid from the University in exchange for properties taken off the tax rolls, it will have to deliver on its part of the bargain, also contained in the July 28, 1971 agreement, to "support greater flexibility in zoning requirements to accommodate mutually satisfactory design solutions" that emerge from joint planning.

The expansion of the University's physical plant, on the scale that it is now proposed -- much reduced from the 1968 master plan -- is, without question, essential. It is essential to accommodate the growth that the University already has experienced since becoming state related. It is essential in order to achieve a minimum level of excellence in some fields, most notably law, that cannot be achieved with the present campus.

In the long run, Pitt's expansion will greatly benefit not only the University, but Oakland, the city, the region and the state. The only reason that Oakland remains a viable community today is because of its institutions. They provide jobs for neighborhood residents, a profitable market for neighborhod merchants, and unprecedented educational, medical and social services to its citizens. Oakland was once the city's Civic Center, embracing almost all of its cultural, sports, medical and educational programs. With the opening of Three Rivers Stadium on the North Side and the new Heinz Hall downtown, Oakland has nothing left but its museum and library, its institutions of higher education, and its medical center. They can more than take up the slack left by the departure of the Pirates, the Steelers and the Symphony, and they can provide a more sustained economic base

than those departed instutitions which were primarily event-oriented.

The City, too, in its attempts to diversify industry and to attract new research organizations, also has an invaluable resource in Pitt and Oakland's other institutions. The kinds of industries which the city and region seek to attract seek out those urban areas where there are thriving educational and cultural enterprises.

And, among all these institutions, Pitt is the largest and most influential. It is clear that Pitt cannot raise the level of its own excellence, and in turn the level of its attractiveness, without this minimum of new facilities.

The lessons of the past two years have been hard-learned by both the University and the community. It is impossible to say whether things would have been different if ODI had been organized and functioning two years ago, since the political and economic pressures that created ODI had not come to fruition at that time.

It also is difficult to make a prognosis about the future of University-Community relations. While there still exists a residue of distrust on both sides, there also is developing an awareness that neither group can achieve its goals without the other. Therefore, one tends to be hopeful that in future months some compromises will be reached on the immediate problems at hand and some further physical development will take place on properties orginally acquired for the Forbes area project. There is even a possibility that the University will begin to view the community, not as a hindrance to its development proposals, but as a potentially valuable political ally that can bring pressure to bear on local and state governments to provide facilities that will benefit both the University and the community.

In conclusion, it is important to note once again that the whole question of

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University-community-city interaction is a wholeheartedly political one, unencumbered by law, and its success may depend on the political futures of the key individuals involved -- that is, which group of administrators predominates at Pitt, which groups of citizens predominate in the community, and what changes, if any, take place in city government. Neither the University, the city nor the community are monolithic organizations, and the future really depends on the emergence in each group of men and women of goodwill.

# # #

PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPUS EXPANSION:

A VIEW FROM A CITY PLANNER

I. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES:

1. THINKING IN TERMS OF THE PHYSICAL EXPANSION OF PITT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF OAKLAND:

a. WHAT ARE THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF YOUR GROUP/ORGANIZATION?

- That future residential, commercial and institutional development take place in Oakland in such a way as to benefit all groups.

(1) To maintain the low to medium density residential community to the south and west, the low density residential community to the north and the high rise apartment area to the east as livable places with appropriate public and private supportive facilities and good public and private maintenance.

(2) To preserve the Forbes Avenue business district as a university and residential service area, to make it more attractive, and to improve public and private maintenance.

(3) To assure the continued presence of the University and its orderly expansion within carefully defined borders as a continuing higher education and job-creating institution for Pittsburgh.

(4) To give particularly attention to the physical and social interface among the community, the University and the business district, i.e. the sharing of spaces and services at the edges of these three communities.

- That no land be taken off the tax rolls so as to lessen the municipal burden on the taxpayers of Pittsburgh.

b. WHAT DOES IT HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH?

- The formation of a joint planning vehicle encompassing key institutions, community and business interests for the purpose of reviewing plans for Oakland, and compromising some individual interests to maintain Oakland

for the diverse groups that share its turf.

- Developing of or causing the development of physical changes in Oakland - new or rehabilitated housing in scale with the neighborhood in size, density and cost, green spaces, improved streets, transportation, circulation and parking.
- Initiating programs that jointly serve the residential community, the business people and the University people such as movies, day care centers, art and dance classes, medical and legal care, bowling, swimming sports.
- Working for better policeprotection, garbage collection, housing and commercial area maintenance, street cleaning, etc.

2. WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE GOALS/OBJECTIVES OF THE OTHER INVOLVED GROUPS/ INTERESTS?

- The University:

  (1) To be able to proceed with its program with a minimum of friction. They recognize the need for concessions to the community to do this but prefer to make these in a more private and controlled fashion.

  (2) To keep Oakland prosperous, safe and attractive so as to protect their investment and to offer a decent environment for their faculty, staff and students.

- There are four active community groups:

  (1) The indigenous long term residents-the Italians who have been there for some time, the small number of black residents, the university-related families and professionals, and some of the student families who settled in Oakland. These represented one community group. Their goal is to protect their property values

and security; to keep the neighborhood attractive and serviceable for their needs; to contain the students as much as possible and to keep them quiet; to discourage speculation because it changes the character of the neighborhood. They have a relatively long term commitment to the neighborhood.

(2) A second group is the older residents, more Protestant, and Republican. They want to encourage speculation so they can get a good price when they are ready to flee, which will be sooner than the first group.

(3) There is still a third community group and this is the group that I will call the radicals. Most of them are university- related in that they are faculty, students, former students, or young architects who have been students or faculty at Carnegie University. They have interest and goals that are slightly different from the interests and goals of the bulk of the residents, although they formed an alliance with the first group for the purpose of stopping the university from expanding in Oakland. This group wants to change the character of the University. They want to change the physical look of the university; they want to make it a more informal, humane place. They want to radicalize education within the university and they want to radicalize the university in its relationship with the surrounding community. They want to dull the sharp line between university and community and encourage much more interaction between the two. On the whole they took a much harder line with the university and were much more irreverent and were willing to indulge in much more confrontational tactics.

(4) A fourth community group is the Chamber of Commerce or the business interests. Their primary concern is to bring as much business into the Oakland community as possible and to keep new businesses from forming in the Oakland community because they want to bring business to the firms that are already existing in the Oakland community.

WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE STRATEGIES AND TACTICS THEY ARE USING TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOALS?

- The University's strategies and tactics:
  - They proclaimed that their expansion program had been approved by a previous administration and that it was very unfair of this administration to raise questions about the expansion program.
  - They claimed that they had gone through an elaborate community planning process and that the community, the students and the faculty had been involved in the expansion plan. Although this was a number of years ago, it takes a number of years for such a program to come to fruition and the community's wishes have changed since then and they could not change their plans at the whim of a changing community.
  - They claimed that they were offering a tremendous service to the City of Pittsburgh and to western Pennsylvania and to the Oakland community in terms of educating the children, the young people of the area, and providing jobs and helping the economy of the area. (In fact, it was no accident that in the course of the conflict the university contracted to have a consultant study done to show what the exact economic effect, both directly and indirectly, of the university was upon Oakland and upon the City of Pittsburgh and needless to say the result of the study showed that the effect was very positive.)

- They repeatedly stated that any particular item was non-negotiable but everything from a certain date, usually January 1972, would be negotiable or that there was too much money involved in this particular item to be negotiable but all other aspects of the plan would be negotiable. In this way they would appear eminently reasonable and yet would be permitted to proceed with the two or three immediate aspects of their expansion program for which they were funded.
- They constantly claimed that the community representatives that they were negotiating with in the group that was meeting were not representative of the community, and the question was repeatedly raised "Who is the community?" Several times when the University thought that they could prove the unrepresentativeness of the group they sought to bring community people to large meetings to support them and to claim that the community people that had been meeting with the university were not representative of the community. In fact, this backfired because every time a large meeting was called a number of people would appear who were clearly indigenous members of the community and who would attack the university and support the group that was negotiating to stop the expansion of the university.

- The communities' strategies and tactics:
  - They showed that the university had ample space within its own boundaries for all of its expansion and did not have to go into the Oakland-Bouquet area in order to serve its needs. This was done very effectively by means of architectural sketches.
  - They examined historically the period in which the master plan of the university was developed and showed the way in which this

planning was done, and that the kind of plan that evolved was a plan that was very much prototypical of a period when no consideration was given to communities and there was no input from communities. The plan was a product of the so-called bulldozer urban renewal period of American urban policy and therefore this University and the city administration could not be held responsible for the kind of thing that had taken place in that atmosphere, and of course, the plan could not proceed and this administration would not want it to proceed.

- They used public relations i.e. going to the press, putting out a leaflet called the Wrecking Ball, getting on TV, and calling large meetings at particularly crucial points. These meetings made clear to the university and to the city and to all those that were participating that sentiment in the community was very anti-university expansion and although a small group was doing the negotiating the total community would in fact support them in their positions.
- They took very hard lines and made extremely rational arguments in support of their position and made the university look intransigent and cruel.
- They took advantage of the fact that the Flaherty administration was community minded and that the Flaherty administration was concerned about the removal of property from the tax rolls for institutional purposes so that they made as much use as they could of the city's policies to support their position.
- They made their very small numbers appear much larger than they were, by the quality of their public relations and the quality of the occasional large meetings that they called.

- Their major tactic was an architectural one rather than a community organizing one, and had the university realized this the university might well have won its position rather than losing as much as it did. The community spent a tremendous amount of time and energy in developing elaborate architectural solutions to university expansion rather than in the kind of door-to-door, one-to-one discussion and mobilizing of people that would have in fact brought together a large community coalition to oppose university expansion. (The indigenous residents within the community were much less intransigent than the radicals and probably would have compromised at a much earlier point because they were simply concerned with keeping the university within its boundaries where the radicals were concerned with the quality of design of the buildings, the quality of the interface, and the offering of services by the university to the community.)

3. WHAT DO YOU SEE AS MAJOR AREAS OF:

a. AGREEMENT

- A major area of agreement between all the groups is concern for the future of Oakland. None of the groups want to see Oakland become a blighted community. All of the groups want to see it as a clean,

prosperous, safe community where residents or students can live and where merchants can prosper.

b. DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS/INTERESTS

- Major areas of disagreement relate to whether the university needs to grow in size, that is expand its student body any more than its present size, and whether with its present student population remaining stable, it needs more space for its present programs. It's basically a disagreement between a residential community that is oriented toward a particular life style and a university that sees itself as very vital to the entire city and the entire region and feels that it therefore has the right to meet <u>its</u> needs even if these needs create inconveniences for the residential community.

II. ISSUES: (Questions 1 - 4)

WHAT IS JOINT PLANNING? IS IT A DESIRABLE WAY TO GET THINGS DONE? WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE THE OUTCOME OF IT? ARE THERE BETTER WAYS OF HANDLING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, IN INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING? WHAT CONSTITUTES A LEGITIMATE INTEREST? WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE? SHOULD THERE BE VETO POWER?

- All these questions came up throughout the long university-city-community period of negotiations. They come up to one degree or another in neighborhood or community organizing work constantly. Generally, I believe that joint planning is a desirable mechanism. However, the question is what should be joint planned and who should joint plan? I think of joint planning as a relationship between an institution and its clients or between equals sharing some similar universe or turf. When the University of Pittsburgh joint plans with the Oakland community the issues appropriate to joint planning are hard to define. The University should primarily engage in joint planning with its own students, faculty and administration about the physical shape of the buildings that it will build and about the kinds of programs that it will institute. Its joint planning process with the Oakland community should not relate so much to those issues as to those ways in which the university impinges upon the Oakland community and the

ways in which the Oakland community impinges on the University. So the concern here would be much more with interface and those kind of facilities that are jointly used, and the total environment which is shared by the University and the indigenous residents. It should be concerned less with specifics such as the university buildings that are internal to the campus and that are going to be used almost exclusively by the university community and not by the Oakland community. What I am saying I suppose is that the university should joint plan intensively with the Oakland community to the degree that the particular facilities that are being planned impinge very heavily on the community and are used very heavily by the community, but when the facilities are very internal to the university, not highly visible to the community, and not greatly used by the community the degree of planning and interchange about the particular facilities can be much less. Therefore, the university would spend a great deal of time in joint planning the edges of its facilities and joint planning the commonly used facilities, those facilities that are used by the university and the community, and joint planning those facilities that are highly visible to the community or that in some way take sun or light or space or air away from the community, but much less time on its other facilities.

5. WHAT SHOULD BE THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF THE COLLABORATIVE PLANNING GROUP (E.G., SHOULD IT BE ADVISORY ONLY OR HAVE VETO POWERS? UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ITS DECISIONS BE FINAL? BE SUBJECT TO RE-EVALUATION, ETC?)

- Obviously veto powers are a legal concept, and it is difficult to force granting of veto powers with no legal status upon another group. Therefore, in reality the success of joint planning depends on the reaching of a consensus especially when there is no legal veto power. Constant confronta-

tion from a position of strength can also give a community organization veto power. Confrontation is difficult to sustain and is not joint planning.

- The university has actually been placed in a position by the community in which it has been subject to a kind of scrutiny and a kind of demand for joint planning that is not reasonable and that is far in excess of that which is asked of any other group in the Oakland area by the community. Part of the reason for this is the University's poor track record, lack of consideration toward the community, lying, manipulative or deceitful practices. The community feels so hostile to the university and has in its own mind established so many reasons for lack of trust of the university that they have justified some of their unreasonableness based on this.
- The problem to make joint planning succeed between the university and the Oakland community is to begin to chalk up some successes, and yet this is a very difficult thing to do partly because of the complexity of the university's bureaucracy. One particular administrator or department of the university may act in good faith and try to resolve certain problems with the community and yet may find that he is stymied and unable to do so because of some bureaucratic problems relating to some other section of the university or because of the Chancellor or some high official in the university not understanding the issue completely or just plain disagreeing. I am sure many a department head or dean has said to the Office of Community Relations several times over the last year and a half: "Now, see here! What kind of nonsense do we have to put up with?" and Mr. Kobosky has a hard time explaining that it all goes back a long time to the days when institutions swallowing up communities was routine, and there was this

building we bought on Oakland Avenue the day we swore we didn't own it, and there were these houses we purchased under dummy coporations, and these houses on Boundary Street that we didn't take care of, etc., etc., and so forth.

- A confusion has been permitted to develop between joint planning for Oakland and joint planning for the university. It's possible for the university, the community, business interests, and the city to sit together and joint plan for Oakland. In the course of joint planning for Oakland a number of specific plans will evolve that may relate to a particular business, a particular home, a particular street, a particular park or a particular building of the university. Some guidelines might be established, some approaches,but the actual planning of the specific facility cannot really be done jointly but has to be done either by the individual who owns his home, the man who owns the business, the Department of Parks and Recreation who runs the park, or the university who builds the buildings.
- The question of veto power has been brought up considerably by the community and ideally I can understand the point of view from which they bring this up. The university is a very powerful institution, the city is a fairly powerful body. Each of them has tremendous decision making powers, a fair amount of money and staff at their disposal. The community has very little power, very little money, very little staff, and very few decision-making powers. This creates a highly unequal situation between the groups and it is the feeling of the community that veto power will solve that problem.
- Actually, there are only two ways to solve that problem and veto power is not something that a community can realistically get just by asking for it. One way to solve the problem is by a joint planning group like

Oakland Development Incorporated which comes together in a spirit of good will and where the cooperation of all the groups is essential. There is a certain amount of prestige attached to successfully cooperating; it is regarded as an important and significant thing to do and the group is working very hard together for the betterment of Oakland. In fact it would look very bad if one member of the group tended to make recommendations that were not for the betterment of Oakland. In a mutally cooperative kind of arrangement like this veto power is unnecessary, because the group will be able to work together and work for their common goals. Of course, this is a situation that doesn't exist here because there is still tremendous hostility between the university and the community and things are still done on much more of a confrontational than a cooperative basis. But if a real joint planning vehicle developed and it were possible to work together in some spirit of good will, it's highly likely that veto power would be unnecessary.

- The other way in which veto power would be unnecessary is if the community was so well organized, so strong, and had so many people behind them that they knew they could in fact stop the university if they wanted to and that they would really have the backing of a very active and united community. If they were that strong and were able to do this they would effectively have veto power without even discussing it, because the university would not really be able to move ahead and do the things it wants to do without the approval of the community. The community groups that have been active in Oakland have nothing like that kind of support behind them and were it not for a rather sympathetic city administration which had some axes of its own to grind it is highly unlikely that the community would have been able to get as far as it did in changing the plans of the university.

6. DOES YOUR PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (I.E., CONCEPT OF WHAT HIGHER EDUCATION SHOULD BE ABOUT) INFLUENCE YOUR THINKING ABOUT A UNIVERSITY'S PHYSICAL PLANT/SPACE REQUIREMENTS? (PLEASE FEEL FREE TO ELABORATE)

- My philosophy about education does influence my thinking about the university's physical plant space requirements. I think of higher education today and more important higher education in the next 5, 10, 15 or 20 years as very different from the monumental-building-oriented education that is now prevalent.
- I think of the university and the community coming much closer together in education. I think of the university as using the community much more as a laboratory, that is a place in which its students can try out the skills that they are learning by offering servies to the community. I also think of the university as a place where the community people can come to learn much more informally than they presently do. I think of classes taking place in a much freer atmosphere and much less awesome locations than the formal classrooms of the Cathedral of Learning. In that educational environment, the kinds of buildings that are being proposed in Forbes Phase 1 would rapidly become obsolete.

7. WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE THE RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS/INTERESTS (E.G., PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES, BENEFITS, SERVICES, USE OF FACILITIES, ETC.)?

- The concept of payments in lieu of taxes is an understandable one considering shrinking population, lowered tax base and tremendous municipal overburden in the city of Pittsburgh. If the university were doing the kind of job that it should be doing - i.e., truly serving the Oakland community, and the Pittsburgh community as a school for the children of Pittsburgh's residents including relatively poor people, who have not themselves had the opportunity to go to college, offering a large number of quality on-going services to the community,then a good case could be made for the university not making any payments in lieu of taxes. The University has moved in this direction in the past five years.

III. PERCEPTIONS:

1. IS THE PHYSICAL EXPANSION OF THE UNIVERSITY'S PHYSICAL PLANT NECESSARY? WHY/WHY NOT?

- I have mixed feelings about whether the physical expansion of the university's physical plant is necessary or not. I can see an argument for keeping the university within Oakland, permitting it some small expansion so that it can better serve the young people of the city of Pittsburgh. Obviously if the undergraduate program moved out of several of the suburban compuses it would make it much harder for the lower income kids who now can live at home and get jobs in the Pittsburgh area while attending school. Of course, there would be certain advantages to these students in leaving the city of Pittsburgh and attending a campus kind of school where they could have an away-from-home experience. Ideally the undergraduate program should be in the outlying campuses and the graduate programs should be in the city and should be accompanied by services to the city so that the law school could be down in court half the time and the medical school could be out in the community, offering various kinds of services as could be School of Social Work the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, the Library Science School, and many of the other schools that offer training to do services that are needed in the city. Actually, I feel that the size of the University in Oakland is about as large as it can be without seriously harming the future of the residential community of Oakland. It's possible that a case could be made for the wisdom of expanding the university while harming the residential community. However, I feel that the presence of the residential community offers something for the university. The fact that young people can come to college and live, shop, eat, and play in an area as diverse as Oakland helps to make Pitt a desirable kind of city

university. If Oakland became a totally university community then Pitt would be a less desirable university to attend.

2. WHAT DO YOU SEE TO BE CONSEQUENCES OF PITT'S EXPANSION FOR:

a. THE CITY AND REGION?

- It is also desirable to see Pitt expand in terms of the training needs of the city and the region particularly in the disciplines in which there will be greater need for skilled professionals in the future. (Of course there are some disciplines in which there is going to be a diminishing need for professionals.) In order to serve this need of the city and the region does all of the University have to be in the City of Pittsburgh?

b. THE OAKLAND COMMUNITY?

- On balance the consequences for the Oakland community of Pitt's expansion are bad. The jobs and education provided can reach a point of diminishing returns where the size of the University brings so many adverse effects that people can no longer live near those jobs and education.

c. THE UNIVERSITY?

- The consequences for the university itself are not necessarily highly desirable. Pitt has now reached a size that is large without being so large that it's totally impersonal. If it got any larger that might start to happen.

3. WOULD THINGS HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT OR THE SAME HAD THE ODI BEEN ORGANIZED AND FUNCTIONING TWO YEARS AGO? (FEEL FREE TO ELABORATE)

- It's very hard to predict what would have happened if ODI would have been organized and functioning two years ago. I suppose one argument might be that it would have been impossible for ODI to have been organized and functioning two years ago, given the hostility between

the university and the community, unless some kind of confrontation process had first taken place. For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that ODI was organized and functioning two years ago. I'm not at all sure that the entire process would have been different unless a great deal of education had been done, particularly with the university administrators, about joint planning, how to negotiate with community groups, and the desirability of doing this. The entire educational process also had to occur about the reasons why the university master plan was not a desirable one either for the university or the community, that it was predicated upon the decline of Oakland as a residential community with the Bates bypass, the widening of Oakland Avenue, the taking of land by Pitt all the way down into Panther Hollow, the putting through of Louisa Street, the greater intensity of development along Forbes Avenue and in fact Oakland becoming a large commercial area serving the university with almost all university-serving housing in the area.

IV. WHAT IS YOUR PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSITY-COMMUNITY RELATIONS?

- My prognosis for the future of university-community relations is not good. I think the university has the will to do an effective job of working with the community but I don't think it has yet developed the kind of skills and sensitivity that will enable it to do this well. I also think that there are differences of opinion within the university and these differences of opinion make it very difficult, and the community senses these differences. Even when one area of the university, the Community Relations Department, is working well with the community the chancellor has some other ideas, the Board of Trustees is concerned with its questions, the Treasurer's Office is concerned with financial problems, the faculty are concerned with classroom space and there are

a number of cross currents of hostility towards the community. At the same time there are many groups within the community that still see the university as their enemy. They perceive a hidden agenda, a master plan, to devour and destroy Oakland.

- Portions of the community are so consumed with hostility toward the University that they are willing to put most of their effort into stopping the University and little of their effort into initiating joint community development and community maintenance programs. This has kept the community off the city's back and probably slowed down the process of identifying and solving some of Oakland's problems.
- I do see some hopeful signs. Some new community people are beginning to emerge as leaders. They seem to have a more positive approach to joint planning.
- The University seems to feel less need to present a unilateral-team position to the joint planning body - and is more able to say "We made a mistake" or "I don't personally agree with that."
- There are institutional and community people active in ODI at this time who are doing their homework, patching fences and giving a great deal of time.
- Perhaps the residents that are not involved at all in negotiations are the most militant against the university because they have not participated in the whole process of the beginnings of communication and compromise, and might take even more militant positions.

V. CONCLUSIONS

These are not really conclusions but a few final observations not covered above.

- ODI may not survive because it may not serve either the University's or the community's most pressing needs. It may not offer the University a link with the community to review and modify its plans for new buildings

if all reviews are always negative. It may not offer the community a vehicle for improving the quality of life in Oakland. It will only survive if it can get over those two humps in the next year.

- If the University and the community do not address themselves to zoning controls and guiding of private development of key sites in Oakland changes may take place of which neither group approve.
- The University needs to use its faculty in their areas of expertise or in their self interest to help solve some of these problems. The community turned to certain key faculty figures for help at critical points, but the University administration appeared to want to shield or bar its faculty from intensive participation in the joint planning process. Such participation might be helpful to the community by giving it more help and to the University by preparing its faculty for compromises.
- The University needs to explore new approaches to its architecture. There seemed to be general agreement that it is unimaginative and mundane.
- The University and the community groups both indulged in a great deal of game-playing and had difficulty in dealing directly and openly. It would be desirable to have more honesty and less posturing and public relations.
- The community needs to put more of its time into doing its homework i.e., mobilizing local citizens on an ongoing basis for participation in ODI.
- ODI must pressure the city for better services and more improvements in the Oakland community.

PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPUS EXPANSION:

A VIEW FROM A COMMUNITY LEADER

The thing to be said by way of introduction is that what is written here reflects my own, very personal viewpoint on the events between the Oakland community and the University of Pittsburgh. I imagine that after working closely with the other individuals in People's Oakland for almost two years, I can sometimes talk about "us," about how "we feel," with a certain amount of assurance. Yet, the emphases here are mine; part of the beauty of People's Oakland is the certainty that each and every member, if asked, would write something very different!

* * * *

When I first became aware of the University's expansion plans in the fall of 1970, I in no way anticipated the existence of a group such as People's Oakland. However, it was quite natural for me to be disturbed and curious about these plans. I have spent all my life in large cities, and most of my life in school, which has caused me to develop certain opinions about the state of each.

My urban credo holds that the city, though plagued by a myriad of problems, is a splendid place to live; that it offers the greatest and most exciting variety of human interactions; that its most invigorating physical feature is its chaotic lack of uniformity, its constant architectural surprises and structural changeability; that the physical changes in the city's landscape should facilitate and enhance the interactions among people who live there; that there are ways to eliminate blight without robbing the city of its energy and population. In short, I regret that Jane Jacobs has moved to Canada.

Ideally, a university should be the most humanitarian of institutions, where already accumulated knowledge changes hands, where there is the will and the time to discover new information and acquire new insights, where a respect for the minds of men and the philosophical intricacies of living are the primary causes for the institution's existence. In addition, I feel that, inherent in this most classical of definitions, is the intent that higher education be applied toward alleviating physical and spiritual crises that exist in the society around it; that it is the duty of a university to provide alternatives and be conscious of the probable consequences; that, in carrying out this duty, the university must constantly seek the depth of human understanding which accepts and respects differences between people and divergence of opinion.

The University of Pittsburgh seems to be vaguely aware of, and even occasionally espouses some of these same sentiments. In his inaugural address of 1968, which appears conspicuously in the University's publication of the "University-Urban Interface Program (...and one University's

response to the urban challenge)," Chancellor Wesley Posvar stated:

> Notwithstanding the consistency of its values, the university is an evolving and a varied institution. It has gone through phases ot involvement in society. It has gone through other phases of withdrawal and insulation....
>
> Now, I suggest, we are on the verge of a new era of public involvement ot the university. I do not refer, however, to the political intervention ot the Middle Ages, nor to the larger infusions of federal financial support for technology. I reter to an unprecedented and qualitative change in the role ot the university, a role that will relate to the fundamental transformation of the human condition in this country during the next thirty years.
>
> ...We shall be in the center of the transtormation of American society. We cannot escape the duty to lead rather than to tollow.

Lead where? Transform to what? Perhaps this is where the conflict between the University and Community originated. The University tried to tell us that the Dieter, Ritchie and Sippel expansion plans were progressive and, consequently, desirable; we were told that it was a sign of progress tor small, occasionally shabby homes to be torn down, and replaced with large, new University buildings. Yet, to may of us, this kind ot transformation did not seem desirable, or even progressive. Massive expansion plans ot this type had already caused widely publicized contlicts in other urban centers; the latest knowledge of urban planning and education suggested that, while the Dieter-Ritchie-Sippel plan <u>might</u> have been marginally adequate at the time of its conception, it would be exceedingly obsolete by the time ot its implementation. This was not necessarily the fault of the designers; its just that the values by which we plan have gone through a qualitative change in a very tew years. Still, in pursuing the adoption of the Master Plan, the University was abandoning "the consistency of its values," refusing to consider the accessable knowledge

pertinant to the situation, and discouraging the search for additional information and insights. Furthermore, despite the Chancellor's words, the University, when confronted, justified its actions by the presence of "larger infusions of federal financial support for technology," rather than considering the real needs of the urban environment, both physical and human. It was made perfectly clear that the overriding University concern was the gain and loss of dollars. Something was wrong; if this was progress, we didn't want it.

When, in the fall of 1970, a newspaper article made me aware of the broad details of the University master plan, I had three basic reactions:

1) these plans are irresponsible in their impact on the surrounding community
2) the university has delusions of grandeur, which prevent it from adequately fulfilling its role as an urban university
3) the proposed buildings are aesthetically barren, wasteful in space usage, and are poor learning environments.

These perceptions, shared by others, became three of the basic tenets behind People's Oakland. To us, the University's expansion plans, those vast and boring slabs of concrete, situated on land which is a vital part of the community's self-definition, are a reflection of the way the University perceives itself. The University seems to feel that the only way it can successfully serve the region, the city, the Oakland community and itself is by erecting bigger buildings to serve a hypothetically larger college population. The value of both the plans and the buildings are (as previously mentioned) measured by how much money the state and federal governmental units are willing to expend, rather than by the actual ways in which the structures will enhance the education of students. We, on the contrary, do not feel that progressiveness is measured either by size or

monetary expenditure but, rather, by concept. I know it may sound simplistic, but we believe that, if the university becomes a good and responsive urban university, one that seeks new solutions to the problems of housing and transportation, etc. rather than exacerbating existing inadequacies, then it will be serving all its constituent communities, from the largest to the smallest, to the best of its potentiality.

On the other hand, to sacrifice Oakland in order to serve the region, is to ignore all our recently accumulated knowledge of the urban situation. If our cities are becoming unlivable and, as our census data indicates, unlived in, it is because the once-stable communities like Oakland are being eradicated, and a city without growing families (and the amenities that families need) is a city which is dying. The migration of white ethnic groups from the city to the suburbs has other serious social implications; once the move to the suburbs is made, the possibilities for cross-cultural interaction become substantially less. To dissolve a heterogeneous neighborhood such as Oakland, no matter how uneasy, is to hasten the more complete separation of racial groups. In addition, when a university sees the comfort of its own population as more important than the welfare of the general population, it is reinforcing the alienation of academicians from the remainder of society, a trend of resentment and reprisal, inherent in the statements of Mr. Spiro Agnew. These human conflicts should be a most primary concern of an urban university; yet, the University of Pittsburgh is deepening these dissonances rather than alleviating them.

We have been asked whether we feel that "the physical expansion of the University's physical plant" is necessary at all. It is a difficult

question to answer, partly because it is couched in such stiff and alien language. To me, "physical plant" is a term best applied to factories, not to schools. That phrase, combined with "physical expansion" indicates something vast and sprawling, an area set aside for university use alone, space clearly defined as belonging to the school complex. Therefore, our answer to this particular question is "no." We do not feel that an urban university - most especially Pitt - should be about the business of acquiring a campus, since the problems it causes will almost certainly outweigh the gains. However, if the university were to ask for more space to conduct specific educational activities, we would be inclined to evaluate the need and quite possibly, find at least some space requests to be legitimate. The problem is not <u>that</u> space is being requested, so much as the <u>kind</u> of space that is requested. We do not feel that the present urban situation accomodates itself to new university buildings, especially when they are designed in a manner which is wasteful and inconsiderate with community land. It is infuriating to residents to be told that buildings along the edge of the park, where they do not interfere with the community (buildings such as Hillman Library and Common Facilities) can't be made into skyscrapers because that would somehow inconvenience the students, when the university's stated alternative is to take over land which is part of the community. (As it happens, the wasteful Common Facilities building is a horrible learning and teaching environment, and has never been convenient for anyone.) The University does not seem aware, or doesn't care, that, instead of causing some students a four-year inconvenience, they are inflicting permanent damage on the lives of some families and the general welfare of a whole neighborhood. Similarly, the University owns two green

and tree-some areas - the Catheral lawn and the hillside; yet, the idea of placing buildings on the lawn was considered sacrilage because students occasionally play on it, while the idea of tearing up the whole beautiful hillside, the only green area left in that area ot Oakland, was perfectly acceptable, seemingly because only residents would be affected.

In a somewhat different, yet somehow related, incident, Chancellor Posvar was busy garnering prestige for himself and Pitt by discussing the relationship between buildings and behavior with Mr. Doxiados, at the Ekistics Institute in Greece while, at the very same time, the citizens of Oakland were trying to explain why the Master Plan would adversely affect their lifestyle. While Chancellor Posvar was overseas being fashionably erudite and liberal, we were desperately trying to convince several Vice Chancellors that less over-bearing, differently scaled structures would foster community-university interaction, while the proposed complex would, conversely, build an invisible wall between the two, even higher than the one of concrete.

One of the most delightful things about People's Oakland is that it brought together a completely improbable coalition of people, a group whose most active nucleus spans races, generation and status groups. It is also more fluid than most groups, with individuals entering and leaving, working with great consistency and then opting out for a while, etc. Because of its range and fluidity, the organization is seldom united in its approach to problems, and yet, despite the varied perspectives which people bring to the group, consensus has been established on several of the philosophical issues involved in the conflicts. If the group is too democratic and diverse for optimum tactical efficiency, it is compensated

by an essential respect for the positions of other participants, and the affection which has grown between members has led to a constant cross-breeding of ideas and viewpoints.

Among community groups, People's Oakland is unique in its merging of the advocate with the client - members of the group play both roles. With the expertise available within our ranks, we have had creative, informational and technical resources which seem to be lacking in most other community organizations. As such, People's Oakland has been a resource for other resident groups and, more recently, for the entire membership of ODI. We seem to do a great deal of writing, research and general hard work for everyone.

Most comprehensively, the goal of People's Oakland is to maintain and improve Oakland as a viable, multi-faceted, ethnically and generationally diverse, residential community. In practical terms, this major aim has produced a variety of smaller goals at different times, throughout the two years. The most prominant of these goals have been to stop Pitt from proceeding with its master plan, and to subject university plans to a more community oriented, more up-to-date set of criteria (i.e. economic efficiency must be weighed against community impact, instead of being considered in a vacuum). From another perspective, this could be interpreted as trying to give the University a new conscience - or a different way of viewing the educational process. Although preservation of the existing community was the goal most often expressed, these other aspects were also mentioned as goals by a number of members.

Strategies and goals are sometimes hard to separate, for there is an area where they seem to blend together. In the case of People's Oakland, we set ourselves the goal of coming up with some exciting alternatives to the University's plans; these alternate proposals became part of our strategy in preventing the implementation of the Dieter-Ritchie-Sippel plan. Our next goal was to get the University to listen to us, which required getting other people to listen to us. If People's Oakland has been at all successful (and we sometimes wonder whether we have), it is because the original core of hillside residents and their friends struck a responsive chord in the other neighborhoods and community groups of Oakland. Certainly, our primary goal is, in many ways, not very different from the stated goals of SOCC, Model Cities, or the smaller block clusbs. Which is not to say there are no differences of opinion but, most often, the differences are matters of politics and general orientation.

Model Cities and SOCC have presented an interesting and often difficult situation. If both, or either, organization had been doing its job of protecting the citizens of Oakland, People's Oakland would have had no reason for existing; however, their primary interest was clearly profit and self-preservation, rather than community preservation. SOCC has just gotten a new administration, and may well decide to play a more active role in the future.

Model Cities came under a new administration last year and offered a kind of passive support for People's Oakland unitil the Oakland Development group came into being; now, it is expressing a desire to take over control of the Oakland Development group, ostensibly to protect the citizens from getting coopted and cheated by the University and other institutions.

Many of us in People's Oakland, who have participated in the Model Cities process quite extensively, find ourselves in a bind. To date, we have no real reason to trust the University or the Hospital Complex - we fear cooptation, and still find that the University lies to us sometimes, and the institutions all seem to omit pertinant information fairly frequently. There are no guarantees for the success of ODI. As yet, the group has not defined and formalized its powers, and Model Cities is the only citizen weapon with the occasional force of law. On the other hand, the Model Cities Program has never had the support of much of white Oakland, has lost the interest of many original participants by its continual inability to perform, and has not yet contributed anything of real value to the community In addition, the bureaucratic structure of the organization has left the citizens with no real power to initiate change, and the staff has been either unwilling or unable to make even the existing projects work. Yet, despite its failure to bring about practical improvement, the Model Cities Program exerts a subtle political influence in the area through its control over jobs and potential money. Given all these factors, it is difficult to tell how the present conflict between ODI and Model Cities will resolve itself, if indeed this is the conflict. Actually, it is more likely that the conflict is between Model Cities and City Planning for control of urban planning functions in the model neighborhoods and/or between Model Cities and the University for a variety of political and programmatic reasons. Whatever the case, the Oakland citizens are pawns in a larger political struggle, and they stand a good chance of losing on all counts.

The fears that Model Cities is expressing about ODI, for whatever motive, are nonehteless, legitimate fears in the eyes of much of the community. While ODI may be better than nothing at all, it is still a very impertect mechanism ior citizen input.

The Oakland Development group, as it is presently constituted, is ot benefit primarily to the institutions and possibly to the City Planning Department. It serves as a body which these large organizations, who already have power, will try to manipulate to achieve their aims, and then use as the legitimization of their actions in the community. At the same time, it remains an unwieldly structure tor citizens to cope with, simply because they lack the resources and power to maintain their proper level of control over the proceedings.

I have become quite cynical about joint planning and its potential for success, partially because I am uncertain as to how such an organization should be structured, in order to avoid the pitfalls to citizens which I have described, and still make the process desirable to institutions. Perhaps it is a realistically impossible task - rather like the lion willingly lying down with the lamb instead of eating it. While joint planning is a highly desirable goal, it may also be an impossible one.

If I were given a choice of how citizens should participate in institutional decision making in Oakland - whether the institution is a university, the City Planning Department or Model Cities, I would opt for a citizen review board with veto power over planning decisions affecting the Oakland community. If Model Cities were functioning, or had any chance of doing so, the Neighborhood Planning Team would, in fact, provide such a review board (which is, no doubt, part of the reason Model Cities is so concerned with the matter). However, in actuality, there is no chance of

Model Cities functioning in this capacity because, from the President and HUD on down to the local staff, there is no desire to see citizens participate in any meaningful or powerful manner. The rank and file Oakland citizenry is forced to fend for itself; hopefully, given time and experience the Oakland community will grow into a united and powerful coalition, without the help of the major institutions.

Another way of handling the problems between the University (or other institutions) and the Community, would be some sort of a brokerage system - a point somewhere between the community control board and ODI. In a way, this was the situation prior to the establishment of ODI, with the City acting as a broker; however, the City is clearly an actor in its own right, and not really neutral, as they would have us believe. A brokerage system would require a truly neutral team of group-workers, liasons, etc. to mediate between the various factions in a dispute and arrive at acceptable decisions, as well as arrange for cooperative ventures when the parties involved make that decision. The groups participating in such a system would fluctuate with the issue. The one condition to its success would be the commitment of all parties to abide by the consensus, once it was reached. Any person or group who was concerned would be a legitimate interest.

In some ways, ODI is the most idealistic of all possible systems we might have dreamt up, because it is predicated on the notion that we are all truly interested in the same goals. Unfortunately, I am either not trusting or not guilible enough to believe that is the case. I believe that the University of Pittsburgh is still interested in pursuing as much of its original plan as possible as efficiently as possible, regardless of its effect on the community; ditto the Hospital Complex; that the Chamber of Commerce, a select group consisting primarily of major propertyowners

(who live elsewhere), is still interested in making money, regardless of how much it costs the community; that City Planning wants to control planning in Oakland, with easy-to-handle citizen input; ditto Model Cities; that the group for the Preservation of Pitt Planning and some other home-owners want to sell their houses to the University at a large profit and get out -fast; that the rest of the citizen groups, whatever their tactics, want to save Oakland from the extinction which is an inevitable by-product of all the other interests pursuing their goals. Given this initial situation, it will take an abundance of luck and love, not to mention dedication and hard work, to make ODI operate as it should.

As it is, the ODI structure (or the disharmonious goals of the participants) has already caused two problems that seem, to me, overplayed or unnecessary. One of these is the matter of representation. This is a problem only because no one is able to get past the concept of voting and, consequently, everyone is vying for control of as large a block of votes as possible. To me, this is counter-productive. Real joint planning can only be done by consensus and,if that is the case, the process should be as open as possible, not as limited as possible. Anyone who has influence over a given issue, or is affected by that issure, is a potential "legitimate interest," and to eliminate their participation is to limit the adequacy (comprehensiveness) of the solution. The reciprocal obligations of participants is another matter which cannot be decided by vote or by a blanket decision, but an agreement that must be arrived at by consensus, one issue at a time. The only obligations that are prerequisites are those dealing with human interactions: participants are reciprocally obligated to listen carefully, act in good faith, be patient, etc. etc.

Despite all its faults, ODI could, just might, turn into an exciting venture if everyone worked very hard at it. Collectively, the group contains a large measure of creativity, diversity and power, which could combine into a truly effective problem-solving unit. Certainly, the problems of housing, land speculation, education and recreation can best, and perhaps only be solved, by a cooperative venture. Coercion is the poorest way of solving problems; it is no credit to our socity that it seems to be the only way that works.

It is useless to speculate on how things would be today if ODI had existed when the issue of the hillside dorms first came about, almost two years ago. Organizations are, in some inexplicable way, products of their time. People do what they are ready for, when they are ready for it; it is unfortunate that they always lag several years behind the needs of the times, and those who attempt to update those responses are generally considered to be crazy. Chances are that, were the University committed to a meaningful ODI two years ago, they would not have been pushing a plan as destructive to the community as the Dieter-Ritchie-Sippel Master Plan.

Whether ODI will miraculously begin to function, and whether University-Community relations will improve, is anybody's guess. If ODI does work, relationships between ODI members will naturally change; already, the individuals who are participating, if not the institutions or groups they represent, have a much more respectful and amicable relationship than they had at the beginning.

My assessment is that three things, at least, are prerequisites for the success of ODI. First, the group must have real power, and its decisions should be abided by; in other words, the group should essentially have a veto over the plans of its members. It it is only advisory, then the citizens are wasting their time participating, for that is condescension by the institutions rather than cooperation with them. The second and third prerequisites for the success of ODI are resolutions for the two-block area and the student housing problems. It the University ends up with the Bouquet-Oakland parcel, and/or it the hillside dorms are built, the citizens will certainly withdraw from ODI, for no caring neighborhood group participates in the distruction of its own community. However, if ODI does manage to consensually solve these two problems, its existence is assured for some time to come; cooperatiove success will bring about the trust that is now lacking, and the enthusiasm and confidence needed for future problem-solving.